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Globalisation and Politics: Conceptualisation of Charismatic Power by the Modern State

Giovanni Zucchelli

ABSTRACT

Starting from the ideal-typical categories coined by Weber, this paper aims to analyse the concept of charisma and its function of unifying force in the formation of social groups. In the oldest societies, it has played an important and essential role, but with the birth of the modern State and the its bureaucratic-legal-rational form, this form of power has declined.

Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, just when the first crisis of the liberal State, charisma presents itself as the true strength of the union group consensus. Globalization heightens the sense of maladjustment of the modern individual. He's devoid of any social bond, but the charisma of populist leaders or neo - fundamentalists trying to redesign a fictitious community of belonging to each individual, to give meaning to their lives.

The applied methodology makes use of a political-philosophical approach, based on the hypothetical-deductive method through bibliographical research. The aim of the article is to show how the sociological and political categories of charism and authority are still pregnant in contemporary Western societies and the possibility of moderating the power of charismatic personalism through democratic institutions.

1.   Introduction

In the contemporary era it seems that we are witnessing the twilight of the nation state. Globalization and the advent of the post-modern are in fact transferring authority and power, at the same time, both to supranational entities and to local authorities: the birth of supranational institutions such as the European Union, for example, the whose goal is the transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational, undermines the very basis of the modern state. Although Member States do not yet have an efficient and coordinated common foreign policy, they have nevertheless managed, despite numerous difficulties, to have a single common currency and, through a European Parliament, to create a European citizenship.

The presence of an external enemy (the Soviet Union), to which an internal enemy (the workers' movement) could correspond, had also represented for a long time a fundamental symbolic and political reference, albeit utopian, in European democracies and beyond (Hosbawm, 1994). Fordism needed workers-democratic citizens because their well-being represented both an economic advantage and an integrative political opportunity, while neo-capitalism aims to split the citizenship-

work relationship to reduce its bargaining power and representativeness. The neoliberal ideology attacks the intermediate bodies (unions and parties) not because they are malfunctioning and inadequate, but on their own as such, since an individual without social networks and solidarity references, "entrepreneur of himself" in an illusory freedom, is a depoliticized subject, without ability or strength of political decision (Preterossi, 2015, p. 29).

This process of privatization of the individual at the expense of a political-systemic vision of the world in which he lives has therefore de facto increased the discrepancy between the ruling class and the people. The loosening of the bonds of social ties starting from the modern age leads in fact to individualization and withdrawal from political commitment. The current situation of uncertainty that characterizes the European States is therefore caused by the progressive distancing between the citizen and the institutions: "In Europe, and specifically in the Eurozone countries, a new populism has emerged with a clear anti-technocratic connotation [...] Fueled by the defective institutional design that governs the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)" (Fabbrini, 2015).

The growing technicalization of political relations between European states has de facto created a hierarchy between creditor and debtor countries, in which citizens do not feel represented by the decisions taken. This anti-elitism has provoked in countries with little political legitimacy internal to anti-European and populist movements, such as the National Front in France and the League and the 5 Star Movement in Italy.

The objective of this article is to analyze precisely the phenomenon of populism and, in general, that of the return of the political charisma in modern democracies, in order not to have a liquidation approach towards what, to date, is the only energy source of an emptied policy. In modernity the nation had in fact compensated for the void left by religion with secularization and monarchical absolutism, whose legitimacy still referred to a principle of transcendence. It was through the democratic-elective revolutionary fulfillment from below that the people acquired that identity function first performed by religion (Böckenförde, 2007, pp. 52-54). The nation was one of the main collective identities produced by modernity and, albeit in an ambivalent way, it was - through the politicization of identity - the glue of society. Democracy was born as a national and in order to make it effective, despite the ideas of universal brotherhood of the French Revolution, "common historical destinies, traditions and memories, common objectives and political hopes" (Schmitt, 1928/1984, p. 303) are needed, capable of redirecting and putting together the dispersion of the social questions of the globalized capitalism through content and not just the rhetoric typical of populist demagogies. But to complete this step, figures are needed that serve as models, as points of reference, but always inserted within a strong institutional framework, capable of containing and directing the leader's transformation and decision-making drive.

In the first chapter the concepts of authority and charisma are analyzed from a historical, political and philosophical point of view. The second paragraph analyzes the relationship of the individual in the community to which he belongs during the process of formation of the modern state, from the bureaucratization of the administrative apparatus to submission to the rationality of the law. The third part investigates the return of the category of personal charisma in contemporary democracies, through the analysis of the crisis of traditional parties and the rise of mass parties and new populisms. The results of the research are explained in the final conclusions: the charism must always be governed and limited by the institutions, which allow the effective development of democracy and avert the risk of new dictatorships based on the authoritarian personalism of a leader.

2.   Charisma and authority in politics

In his work Republic, the Greek philosopher Plato affirmed that man's association with man is based on mutual needs and the resulting exchange between the transfer of a good and the provision of a service. Every undertaking, based on the assumption of cooperation, features interwoven elements, whereby each individual is called upon to collaborate in the part of the work that falls under their responsibility, with this collaboration being an essential component (Conte, 2010, p. 137). Moreover, the specialisation and division of professions depends on natural aptitude and training: the former is innate, the latter is a matter of experience and education. As a practical enterprise, the State relies on the control and correlation of these two factors, i.e. the strengthening and development of human capacities. So, wherever there is a society, needs are satisfied and services are exchanged. This breakdown was one of the most profound innovations in his social philosophy.

There is politics whenever a project entails the favourable disposition of other wills: political art is a technique, which tends to merge the different wills in existence into a single purpose. It is authority (in the sense of auctor, the author, or who creates, causes or determines something and in that of auctoritas, a term deriving from the verb augeo, "to increase", and what authority, or who holds it, constantly increases is the foundation) that is capable of giving life to aggregates (Arendt, 1958/2006, pp. 121-122). Authority is said to be the principle of the action of one will over another; this action presupposes the determining force, on the one hand and the recognition thereof, on the other (Galli, 1991, pp. 432-443). The term auctoritas should also be contextualised in terms of space and time: from the early days of the Republic of Rome to the last years of the imperial age (Arendt, 1954/2001, p. 165). The Latin word auctoritas means "to promote, to give meaning, to guarantee" and it is linked to the realm of the sacred (Prodi, 2011)[1]. It therefore had a founding, legitimising value, because it harked back to the sacred tradition of the ancient founding fathers of the city and represented the continuity of their intentions. Authority was, in fact, personified by those who constituted the Senate, that is to say the elders and patres, who, through tradition, were closely connected to the founding fathers of Rome.

Authority is "the ability to convince others to consent" (De Jouvenel, 1971, p. 39), but an "authoritarian government" is not one that uses violence to enforce compliance, otherwise it would indicate that it does not have sufficient authority to achieve its objectives. Leaders have always been a product of natural ascendancy, that is to say charisma, pure authority[2], which leads to dedication and trust, which is entirely personal, in the revelations, heroic character or other leadership qualities of an individual. Charismatic power is typically embodied by prophets in religion and by leaders and great demagogues in politics[3]. Charisma, therefore, has two peculiarities: the first is that it possesses an extraordinary character, transcendent in nature, such that it can become the main vector of revolutionary social change (Cavalli, 1981, pp. 161-188). It is opposed to established order, to tradition and everyday life and can create a new order in accordance with the changed circumstances of the moment (Rehberg, 2005, p. 18).

The second is that it indicates the profound relationship that exists between authority and its subordinates, i.e. the mechanism of domination that it generates (Weber, 1922/1961, p. 438). This, according to Weber, is the decisive character of charisma: "From a conceptual point of view, it is entirely irrelevant how the quality in question should be evaluated according to ethical or aesthetic criteria, or criteria of other kinds, which are 'objectively' correct; what matters is only how it is actually evaluated by those who are charismatically dominated, by 'followers'" (p. 238). Power, therefore, is not authority: the essential characteristic of authority is that it is not exercised except on those who accept it freely, while "power must be understood [...] as the possibility for specific commands to be obeyed by a certain group of individuals and not as any possibility of exercising power or influence over other individuals [...]. A modicum of will to obey, that is to say an interest in obedience, is inherent in every authentic relationship of power" (p. 207).

A group formed around a leader is not democracy, given the uncontested predominance of the leading figure, nor is it autocracy, since the decision of the leader is not at all independent from that of their followers. The leader obtains obedience by virtue of their ascendancy, but, above all, thanks to the fact that their commands are appropriate to the characters and inclinations of each member of the newborn group. The leader could be considered a primus inter pares[4], whose legitimacy lies in the result of their actions. For this reason, the trust that acolytes have in their leader is neither blind nor absolute and can crumble if "there is a lack of proof over a prolonged period, if the party invested with charisma seems to have been abandoned by their god or their heroic or magical power, if they have not been successful for a long time, and if, above all, their leadership does not bring any benefits to the dominated parties" (Weber, 1922/1961, p. 239) Attention is also drawn to the inner awe that binds

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[1] Power has always consisted above all in defining the transcendent nature of the sacred and enclosing it on this earth, not expelling it as a demon. This allowed the de-magification of the world and the birth of politics and economics as techniques, according to the famous vision of Max Weber. It also allowed the growth of tolerance and subjective rights. This is our conquest of secularism.

[2] It can be defined as "an extraordinary quality of a personality, by reason of which it is judged endowed with supernatural or superhuman forces and properties, or at least exceptional in a specific sense, not accessible to others, or as sent by God or as clothed with an exemplary value and consequently like Führer" (Weber, 1922/1961, p. 238).

[3] "In the epochs tied to tradition, the charisma is the great revolutionary power." (p. 242).

4 In the eyes of the members he is just another member of the group who recognizes an ability to express and transform into choices what the group itself wants and considers right to want. The leader himself, on the other hand, does not recognize himself as a leader: he considers himself perfectly equal to all the others. This identification of the leader with the other members and between them and with the leader is asymmetric only from the point of view of the external observer, not of the internal experience (Alberoni, 1981, p. 201).

the bearer of charisma to their followers: from a subjective standpoint, we can recall the vocation, mission and dimension of the extraordinary (p. 444); objectively, that is to say the involvement of the followers, there is a "state of need" or crisis (Trevi, 1993, p. 124).

Should the leader leave the group, their comrades would promise to follow their instructions: here we have the transition from de facto authority to de jure authority. This evolution of the group can be achieved, not only if beliefs exaggerate the prestige of the founder to an enormous extent, even to their sanctification (Weber, 1922/1961, pp. 244, 446), but also if means of repression intervene in support of the founder's instructions. It is also of paramount importance for every society that the holder of auctoritas is immediately replaced by another, without the slightest possible uncertainty or discussion in the event of their absence, in order to avoid disputes arising from the personal interests of each acolyte. In Weber, there are two ways in which charisma can be concretised: one is through blood transmission (Erhcharisma), i.e. hereditary; the other is by transmission of the role, through magical initiation rites (Amtcharisma), which allow charisma to pass from person to role (charisma of office) (pp. 459-462).

Marc Bloch conducted a very interesting study of the supernatural character attributed to the power of kings during the Middle Ages in Europe in his work The Royal Touch. It emphasises how the idea of a charismatic healing power, held by the monarch and transmissible from father to son, lasted at least until the end of the 18th century. The study analyses the consecration of kings, something which evidently forms the basis and origin of their thaumaturgical abilities. The king is a magician and healer because he has been consecrated, that is to say he has been legitimised by the divine. A king's power has, therefore, always oscillated between religious and political, between sacred and profane, in early medieval and medieval western culture. This lasted until the official institution of consecration: "the ecclesiastical consecration of the advent to the throne and, more specifically, the related fundamental rite, the anointing" (Bloch, 1924/2007, p. 46).

The succession of power from father to son, a mode implemented almost universally, can only be explained if one admits that the benefits bestowed by the rex essentially depended (on the principle of preserving power) on a blessing common to the entire stirps regia, without it being possible to know in advance which members would possess the strongest conservative ability. Among the Franks, all blood princes born of a reigning father were considered to have a prevailing right over those born before the ascent to the throne; however, in this case, one should not speak of "right", but rather of the probability, as perceived by the subjects, of the strong presence of mana: the preferred party was the one who seemed to have a greater probability of being a bearer of fortune (Kern, 1948, pp. 12-27).

The ancient notion of fas attributes social prosperity to the virtue of ruling, while that of nefas to the vice of authority[5]. What seems incongruous is that the rulers' actions are conceived as directly focused on natural or supernatural forces, while it is plausible that they are only exercised on human forces to better coordinate them. The floods of the Nile are considered beneficial today thanks to the construction of the canals and dams that the Pharaohs had built, while the Egyptians believed that those floods occurred due to the virtue of the Pharaoh and the obedience of his people, who became aware of the reason for the construction of dams and canals. The conclusion is identical (good Pharaoh, good floods), but it is the internal order, clarifying the relationship, that differs: one is poetic, the other positive.

The prestige of the founder had made the organisation accepted, that of the organisation would have supported the leading successors. The founder's successor will then always call upon "the author" to confirm their authority over the others, invoke or take their name, acting as if they are still present: the former has established the role, while the latter will draw their prestige from the institution. In this way, authority is institutionalised. This means that the effectiveness of power contributes, in turn, to the legitimation process. In this regard, Gaetano Mosca (1896/1982, p. 633) said that "the political class does not justify its power solely by de facto possession, but tries to give it a moral and even legal basis", stressing that social recognition is at the heart of authority.

Finally, power demands uniform social behaviour on the part of the submissive in order to obtain organisation. Institutions will be fundamental as of the modern Western age because they are the concrete product of the multiple encounters between command and obedience that have been

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[5] In *Georgiche* by Virgilio (I, 268-269) derives the common definition of *fas* as *lex divina*, as opposed to *jus*, the human *lex*. It "indicates the lawfulness of behavior in relation to a supernatural power" and is opposed to the term nefas, which indicates all that "cannot be done without incurring the reaction of nature itself or the wrath of the gods" (Sini, 1991, pp. 84-96).

established through legitimation and discipline. It is necessary to behave accordingly in order to eliminate private conflicts: disputes are neutralised in favour of institutional rule (Schiera, 1994, pp. 17-48). This is because the more distant authority is, the less effective its action, as its remoteness does not allow it to exercise its natural ascendancy over others and as this remoteness makes the order less appropriate to those who receive it, which therefore loses the character of immanence, assuming that of transcendence (Bentham, 1776/1948, p. 90). The charismatic ideals, which, in this way, have become ever-existing norms, required for the very survival of the organisation, are then translated into an object of education that can be acquired by others, especially acolytes, who will draw up laws in accordance therewith (Weber, 1922/1961, p. 466).

Berger and Luckmann emphasise how the actions performed by members of a group, whether performed alone or in groups, determine a mutual expectation based on the role assumed. This has the immediate benefit of making one's actions predictable, releasing both from the tension of having to rework their role and meanings in the relationship, which have now become routines. The process that leads to situations being repeated involves the important psychological advantage that choices are reduced, thus releasing the energy for decisions that involve deliberation and innovation. The world is so well known because it is always the same in its evolution and the need to redefine each situation from scratch time after time is eliminated. These customary processes precede any institutionalisation which takes place wherever there is a mutual typification of customary actions by implementing groups (Berger, Lukmann, 1966, pp. 70-88).

The more generations within the group that follow on from one another, the more the ritualised actions appear as something external and coercive which one can only obey, because they are presented as the only possible actions, equipped with their own identity and autonomy with respect to individuals' will. Habitual actions have now acquired the character of historicity, which has made them "objective", and the objectivity of the institutional world becomes more rigid and "opaque", not only for children, but also for parents. For children, the world transmitted by their parents is not fully comprehensible, because they had no part in its creation and it is presented to them as a given reality. Every institution appears as given, unaltered and self-evident, there before a child's birth and continuing to be there after their death; their will is powerless to eliminate them. The process of transmission then reinforces parents' sense of reality, as, almost inevitably, there is a process of self-conviction about their choices. As such, whether a power is legitimate depends first and foremost on tradition, that is to say on the authority coming from the past, consecrated by a very ancient validity based on custom (Weber speaks expressly of "obedience given by virtue of duties of reverence"[6]).

With the advent of modernity and the development of the state structure, charismatic power will slowly be replaced by legal-rational power. The de-personalisation of authority, now residing in the state's bureaucratic structure, as well as the elimination of the religious aspect from society, with it becoming a matter of personal conscience, will lead the charismatic power to progressively disappear from the political scene, (Weber, 1924/2014), at least until the great post-war crisis, when mass parties will enter the political arena, with the involvement of the entire population in the active electorate.

3.   The individual in the modern state

The great process of individualisation of the subject took place with the revolution brought about by Christianity. As Benjamin Costant (1819/1952) said, the freedom of the ancients consisted in collectively, but directly, exercising many functions of society, placing the need for action by the subjects at its centre. In this world, belonging to the political community required the systematic subordination of the private sphere to community life. With specific reference to the Greek polis, this results in the notion of subjective law being inconceivable, intolerance of civil dissent and conscientious objection in particular, symbolically demonstrated by the trial of Socrates; the inconceivability of institutionalised political opposition; the practice of ostracism; the idea of a citizen's property being an asset that fundamentally belongs to the political community which can, therefore, always make use of this asset by removing it from the citizen (Cesareo, Vaccarini, 2006, p. 89).

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[6] By power we must mean the possibility of finding obedience, to certain people, to a command that has a certain content; and by discipline we must mean the possibility of finding, by virtue of an acquired disposition, a prompt, automatic and schematic obedience to a certain command by a plurality of men. (Weber, 1922/1961, pp. 51-52).

The sociological idea of the Gospel is based on the absolute individualism of the immortal soul and implies that absolute universalism arises from individualism which is equally as absolute (Troeltsch 1912/1941, pp. 51-54). This freedom is fundamentally private in character and concerns everything that guarantees the private independence of citizens against power. It is the freedom of Christianity, which places the subject at its centre, a subject which is unique and unrepeatable because of their personal relationship with God, but equal in dignity and value to their fellow human beings because they are all children of God. This is the epochal passage in the conception of the State and associative life. Whilst in ancient society, one takes the State as a basis for understanding the individual, in the modern day, one takes the individual as a basis for understanding society and the State, so that "from a legal point of view, men and women are considered subjects, and no longer objects of law" (Bongiovanni, 1981, p. 71).

The modern concept of sovereignty was devised between the medieval and modern era, precisely from this change of perspective, when the new, powerful rising class, the Bourgeoisie, began to demand a certain form of political and economic equality towards ancient feudal privileges, an exclusive legacy of the nobility and clergy. In exchange for fairer tax for the entire population and a defence policy that would support and stimulate manufacturing and commercial activity, instead of the classes, the individuals/Bourgeoisie became the political interlocutors of the State. On these grounds, individuals became aware of the identity and commonality of their private interests, acquiring an increasingly critical and active attitude towards the management of the State.

And so civil society was formed: an organised set of private interests divided into classes on the basis of the capitalist model. The Weberian ideal type of the Bourgeois is the homo oeconomicus: "the person qualified to act rationally with respect to the purpose, motivated by the pursuit of economic interests, represents an individualistic declination of subjectivity, in that they act by rationally calculating what is useful or harmful to themselves" (Cesareo, Vaccarini, 2006, p. 317). The conception of a State in which individuals are free and equal, with no difference in class, led to the political establishment of power, monocentric and rationally managed. Religion became a personal matter and no longer a founding constituent element of the State: the Bourgeoisie no longer needed moral judgements for salvation in the afterlife, but concrete actions to safeguard their own commercial interests, which needed an efficient bureaucratic, administrative structure (Prodi, 2000).

After the terrible devastation and deaths that the Thirty Years' War brought to Europe, in which religious wars reached the peak of their violence and atrocities, there was an evolution in political philosophy. In a situation of perennial conflict where peace and security had been lost, the problem of justice had to be solved by a formal rationality that had geometry[7] as its model and that, with its objectivity, eliminated every dispute and conflict. The specific character of the modern state, as Schiera (2000) affirms, therefore consists of the attempt and the competence attained to dominate, condense and overcome conflict, starting precisely from confessional wars. This is how international order was born and codified with the peace of Westphalia: to exist, the State must have peace.

The question is no longer that of recognising a common nomos, nor that of guiding the community on this basis, but rather that of letting everyone pursue their own good and faith on their own account, privately, avoiding conflict. The defence of citizens became the very defence of freedom, because they were the only class legitimised by the State, which, in turn, was the only one entitled to defend it. The reform of the courts and justice, if, on the one hand, benefited the weaker subjects, on the other hand, precisely by protecting the subjects, saw an increase in royal power: it had the prerogative of defending everyone. There is no more room for ruling, but what is needed is a power consisting of the strength of all, which makes any differences in strength between individuals irrelevant and therefore avoids the supremacy of one over the other and any claim to rule (Schiera, 1994).

In Althusius, there was a right to resistance; now, it would be an abuse of power by individuals who claim a difference of their own. It is only common power, i.e. political power, that makes the equality of individuals possible, and the only law is the expression of will. This passage is also

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[7] Hobbes considers geometry as the only science that God has liked to give to man, whose conclusions have become incontrovertible. (Hobbes 1651/1946, pp. 21, 27)

In *De Cive* he will then use a mechanistic metaphor, that of the clock, to clarify the method of analysis of the company used: "As in a watch [...] one cannot know what the function of each part and each wheel is if it is not the matter, the figure, the movement of the parties are decomposed, and separately, so in the investigation of the law of the State, and on the duties of citizens, it is necessary, if not to decompose the State, to consider it as decomposed, in order to correctly understand which is human nature, in what things it is suitable or unsuitable to build the state, and how men who intend to meet must agree". (Hobbes, 1642/1992, p. 71).

highlighted by the philosopher Hannah Arendt (2002): "What happened was that rule over others, which originally had been experienced as rule over slaves and therefore as a prepolitical condition for the life of the polis, entered the political realm itself and, by dividing men who lived together into those who ruled and those who were ruled, even became its dominating factor. From then on, that is, almost immediately after Aristotle, the problem of power became the decisive political problem, so that this whole realm of human life could be defined, not as the realm of living together, but as the realm of power struggles in which nothing is so much at stake as the question of who rules over whom."

In this respect, the police have played an essential role. From the 16th century onwards, the German princes used this apparatus to impose their authority on the Kaiser, externally and internally, against the classes of the region, and so they then had a disciplining function across the region[8]. In the following century, intervening administratively and politically where the Holy Roman Empire was unable to do so, the police allowed the princes to carry out their centralising project, especially in Prussia, where it became synonymous with order in a mechanical, egalitarian state (Schiera, 1976, pp. 1001-1004).

The police were originally established as an instrument to regulate the daily problems of social life and severe sanctions are foreseen and are effectively applied to support an anti-opposition policy (Lasswell, Kaplan, 1950, pp. 74-75). However, with the monopoly of the power acquired by the prince of the region, they dealt with the problems related to a State in the process of formation, such as administrating a stable army, rationalising and centralising the tax system, creating a professional administrative system and developing the economy for the welfare of the subjects. Precisely for this reason, a close union was created between the standard of living for the subjects and the efficiency of bureaucracy and the state, maintained by the revenue from taxation: without the former, it was not possible to achieve the latter, and vice versa.

The legal power of the administrative apparatus is therefore typical of the modern world. It is made up of abstract rules, considered to be valid in themselves, which, through jurisdiction, govern individual cases. Being neutral and valid indiscriminately for all subjects subject to them, the rules exorcise the command of man over man, because the holder of legal power is also subject to them. In this form, the objective, impersonal element prevails, not so much with regard to legitimacy, which depends on the subjective belief of those who are willing to obey, but with regard to the object of belief, which does not reside in a person's subjective qualities, but in the objective, impersonal qualities of the rules. You no longer obey man, but the law (Winckelmann, 1952, p. 74).

Election, as an expression of citizens' will, is the only act that can legitimise the representative body; that is why the representation of the king, based on inheritance, does not appear legitimate, as only the will of individuals can legitimise the general will expressed by the representative body[9]. Voting is no longer an expression of determined will on the part of the citizen, as a transmission of will, typical of feudal society. With the Constitution of 1791, there can no longer be the principle of the "binding mandate", because the freedom of the representative can no longer be bound by particular wishes, since, at the time of election, they must represent the whole nation. On the contrary, representatives will be bound by the decisions of the representative assembly, because it will express the will of the entire nation, which is superior to that of the individual. The foundation of power now no longer comes from God, but from below; nevertheless, it expresses the general will, always from above, becoming independent of citizens' individual wills (Duso, 2003, p. 131).

Alexis de Tocqueville (1840/1992) sensed this problem in his Democracy in America of 1840. The modern individual paid for their private independence at the price of becoming "sovereign in appearance", i.e. delegating their sovereignty to representatives. And this "private freedom"[10], typical

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[8] During the modernization process of Germany, the classes did not disappear. They only ceased to represent an alternative to the prince politically and administratively, but became the ruling class of the bureaucratic apparatus and the army, thus becoming part of a system that if legitimized their position, at the same time strengthened the figure of the prince.

[9] "The modern system of political representation would be an artifice to make popular control over government policy possible in communities too large to self-govern in forms of direct democracy. The axiom of the elections recovers the fiction of identity, postulating that through the elective mechanism it is possible to obtain the identity of political will between representatives and representatives" (Accarino, 1999, p. 9).

[10] Arendt (1958/2006) is also of the same opinion. In fact, in a passage from his speech on freedom among the Greeks he affirms: "The opinion of the Greeks, for whom a life spent in the private experience of 'what is proposed' (idion), outside the common world, is' idiot ' for definition" (p. 28).

of a society where there is formal equality between subjects (i.e. modern democracies), would have a social levelling made of mediocrity, uniformity and conformism, laying the foundations for the emergence of a new type of despotism: absolute, systematic and milder: "If I try to imagine the new aspect that despotism may have in the world, I see an innumerable crowd of equal men, intent only on procuring small and vulgar pleasures, with which to satisfy their desires. [...] Above them, there is an immense power to protect, which only takes care of securing their property and ensuring their fate. It is absolute, detailed, regular, provident and mild. It would resemble paternal authority if, like this authority, its purpose was to prepare men for manhood, whilst trying instead to fix them irrevocably in childhood, it loves citizens to have fun, as long as they don't think they are having fun" (pp. 732-733).

The modern-industrial society, based on social discipline, was therefore characterised by the conformism of its members. According to Hobbes, the ethical conditions of good living were no longer questioned, but questions were now being asked about the conditions of survival, that is to say citizens' safety, who, by nature, are prey to their own instincts. Hence the need to "establish political action on the absolutely certain basis of scientifically organised technology" (Habermas, 1973, p. 101). The Rule of nobody is the very bureaucratic apparatus, the anonymous power represented by the technicality that prevails in today's societies (Arendt, 1972, p. 138). The morality of duty approaches reality in terms of means-end and gravitates around the concept of discipline, that is, to immediately find ready obedience (Weber, 1904/1965, pp. 288-289). It is the result of a process of training in routinized behaviour. This causes the subject to lose all sense of existence. Secularisation has taken away the ascetic character of these impositions, which, however, have remained unchanged, because they conform to the productive-bureaucratic structure of modern society (Cesareo, Vaccarini, 2006, pp. 117-118).

With the Second Industrial Revolution, the outbreak of the First World War and the advent of new ideologies, the modern state changed. The model of liberal democracy, as it had consolidated between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had largely removed the social issue, imagining a state founded on a single homogeneous class, the Bourgeoisie, and their values (Mastropaolo, 2015). This provoked the rupture of the political system of the state conceived as opposed to society. It could only exist with a substantial identification between the two levels: with the enlargement of the base to the new subjects of the social sphere (proletarians of the industrialisation process), the system ruptured, even if the participation of the masses increased through the extension of suffrage and arrival of mass political parties (Schiera, 1987, pp. 623-631).

With the growing demand for inclusion brought by the working-class masses, the Constitution could no longer be a mere fence within which internal conflicts took place and ruled, but it had to have a programmatic aspect of tension towards the Common Good. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948, like the French post-revolution Declaration, regards every human being as a subject of international law, whose freedom and equality are inalienable rights, which are thus recognised with a pactional nature in State Constitutions, as well as at suprastate level (Ferrajoli, 1997, p. 40).

4.   The return of charisma in contemporary societies?

With globalisation, the production cycle involved in industrial production has broken down and been relocated to various parts of the world, causing the loss of state control over the economy. Multinationals are the new players in this process of fragmentation; they locate production in different states in order to make greater profits, often breaking the rules and leaving the headquarters of their administrative and political activities in the countries of origin, causing a crisis of sovereignty in the host country. Moreover, with the expansion of financial markets operating in real time across the globe, the State has been replaced as the primary source of capital provision.

This has de facto increased the process of privatisation of the individual at the expense of a political-systemic vision of the world in which they live. The loosening of social ties starts from the modern age and leads to individualisation and withdrawal from political commitment. A person, instead of being interested in the public dimension, tends to make their private life a finite world. In that world, the only rules are those dictated by one's own reflexivity, one's own emotions, where the

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The "private" is therefore strictly connected to deprivation: "Living an entirely private life means first of all being deprived of the essential things for an authentically human life: being deprived of the reality that derives from being seen and heard by others [...] to acquire something more lasting than life itself. The deprivation implicit in privacy consists in the absence of others." (p. 44).

other is absent and comes into contact only as a resolver of a need (Cesareo, Vaccarini, 2006, p. 168). Modernity replaces the heteronomic determination of the social condition with compulsive, obligatory self-determination (Bauman, 2000, p. 23). The choices are the result of absolute autonomy, without any point of reference. But community is lacking, because it was community that gave us a sense of security, which is fundamental for a happy life (Bauman, 1999, p. 5). Paradoxically, as a consequence of this situation, the increase in the possibility of choice does not correspond to an increase in the capacity for choice, but rather to its weakening (Cesareo, 1990, pp. 10-14). For contemporary humans, freedom of choice does not mean deciding, but keeping the possibility of choice open, which leads to an abstention from choice (Lasch, 1985, p. 24). The vertical collapse of those who go to vote in recent years is nothing more than bitter confirmation.

In this crisis situation, charisma returns in the political form of Populism. Populist parties are based on the direct relationship between the leader, endowed with charismatic authority and capable of embodying the social and political movement, and their electorate. Generally, these parties challenge the current political and economic world with its leaders, obtaining consensus generally during periods of crisis (political, economic and social), to which they respond in a simplistic but immediate way, understandable to all segments of the voting public. Generally speaking, as Yves Mény, President of the European University Institute in Florence and a populism scholar, says, populism is the shortcut to institutionalised politics, which is born precisely when crisis occurs. "Populism does not refer to the leader as the embodiment of authority only: the leader is also the one who expresses, through their person, the values of which the 'people' are bearers. Thanks to their charisma, they are able to mobilise energies in service of the people and the nation" (Meny, Surel, 2001, p. 100). The head demagogue is a person who appears both ordinary, because of their origins, direct language and simplistic explanations, as well as out of the ordinary, thanks to their incisiveness and communicator ardour, amplified thanks to modern mass media communication techniques.

In plebiscite democracy, typical of the national-socialist movements of the first half of the 20th century, the holder of power does not lose his quality as Herr, but maintains it: he is the Führer, who formally bases his power on free election, and therefore on a typical element of legality (Duso, 2003, p. 131). The fundamental characteristic of this political form is the mixture of the personal element of the leader and the fundamental elements of the modern state, i.e. rational economy and formal law: the political obligation becomes strengthened in this way, because it acts on both factors, i.e. rationality and instinct. In populist parties, however, the bureaucratic structure is less accentuated, while the role of the charismatic leader is emphasised. The main characteristic is, in fact, the personalisation of power, which tends to emphasise the element of trust and, as far as possible, the direct relationship with the representative, in an (in truth, rather confused) attempt to reduce the importance of the parties and their agendas (Sennet, 1977/2006, p. 346).

By demonstrating "authenticity in public" (p. 29), a leader creates consensus, because it corresponds to the deep-rooted expectations that citizens place in a privatised public sphere. The leader has lost extraordinary characteristics, highlighted with Weber, but they try to reproduce the private sphere of everyone, with their private interests and personal ambitions. "In reality, the leader does not need titanic, heroic or demonic qualities to be charismatic; they can be amiable, simple or kind, or even sophisticated and refined. But if they can focus people's attention on their personal taste, partner's clothing or love of dogs, then they can attract and dazzle as much as a demonic figure. One day they have dinner with an ordinary family, attracting everyone's attention, and the next day they enact a law that harms workers without anyone noticing, since the general enthusiasm is still focused on the dinner of the day before" (Tuccari, 1991, p. 332).

Populism can therefore be defined as anti-politics par excellence, which, in solving problems, aims to divert attention from action and place it on intentions. And with an easy life thanks to the impolitic character of the citizens: secularised, consumerist, above all in their relations with others, without any ideological connotation, if not the mere satisfaction of their private interests. These parties, faced with the problems of work, integration and the economy that characterise contemporary society, propose a closed, homogeneous society, typical of the nation-state of the late nineteenth century. Since the bonds of individuals have unravelled, the invention of mass nationalisation is proposed once again for the symbolic enhancement of the conservation and biological reproduction of its members, expressing biological (the blood) and territorial (the environment in which one lives, the soil) solidarity.

Belonging therefore derives from birth, wanting to reproduce the homogeneous society, in which cultural differences are diminished until they disappear, typical of Rousseau (Zagrebelsky, 2007, p. 120). The idea of integration that populist parties transmit is very ambiguous, and is given by the fact that, at the origin of action, there is a culturally, politically and economically strong subject and a weak subject. To integrate, to reach the whole, then means, in positive terms, to add to the strongest what they lack to complete themselves but, in negative terms, to take away from the little one their reason for being, what makes the difference, their DNA (Colaianni, 2009).

Another important factor in the end of state authority lies in the new dimension of globalised warfare, which, through terrorism and new local nationalisms, no longer has borders, but extends across the whole globe, making the situation even more critical (Bauman, 1998). The State is no longer alone in legitimately using force; on the contrary, the cases of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, or more recent cases in the Middle East, highlight this criticality. The terrorist attacks in Paris on 7th January 2015 at the headquarters of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and those of 13th November at the Bataclan theatre, Stade de France and three Parisian restaurants show how the process of integration has failed on French territory and how the sense of estrangement and bewilderment of contemporary mankind applies especially to immigrant populations.

To restore strength to the democratic regulation of the financial economy, the ethical-political assumptions of the political systems must be strengthened. According to Habermas, it is the welfare state that allows politics in the democracies of the second half of the twentieth century, on the basis of the union between capitalism and the frame of the nation state, but with globalized capitalism, these balances have disappeared. The rule of law presupposed a strong state and a compact homogeneity supported by a strong administrative institutionalization based on the principle of national authority. The need for a charismatic guide was born precisely to compensate for the symbolic loss produced by the collapse of the ancient legitimations, but the new media are likely to degenerate the charismatic power into populism (Preterossi, 2015, p. 80).

With the affirmation of mass parties and pluralism, the people can no longer be understood as a substantial unity, endowed with ethnic-naturalistic connotations, but as a design will, an address, as modern constitutions have been understood. As a political concept it is an artificial will, but how does a people become a people? The founding pact of the people is the true foundation of society (Rousseau, 1762/1966, p. 21). So the Constitution and its inspiring principles must be the guidelines of a nation's democracy. Institutions must return to being the reference point for citizens and the means by which the people and their representation can dialogue.

5. Conclusion and policy implications

After analyzing the categories of charisma and authority, we have seen how without a state administrative bureaucratic apparatus there is a strong risk of the degeneration of modern democracies. In fact, the excessively accentuated personalism of authority not limited by a rational-formal institution risks being aribtrary and demagogic. On the other hand, without a unifying element that holds a community together, it is difficult to think of a society that has a common good and shared democratic practices.

For this, the phenomenon of the charismatic personalization of politics is not to be demonized, being an evolution of the democratic crisis. It is therefore not a relic of the past, a pre-modern and pre-state drive, against which to erect rational and bureaucratic barriers, both economic and political. Indeed, the charisma has been able to adapt to the new global communication environment, based on the flexibility and volatility of the orientations. It harmonizes old and new feelings by directly addressing the protagonists through a territorial and social mix, personal and virtual. However, the task of the representative for and of the people must be to be able to keep the nation together: the idea of people in the contemporary world has in fact lost its cultural, ideological and ethnic characteristics. In fact, in English people express themselves with the term people, that is people, but people is not a community, but a group of individuals. This explains the volatility of populist movements, at the mercy of individual moods (Calise, 2016, pp. 83-85).

In order to become majority and stable, the political charisma must be able to integrate itself into the codes of "public democracy" while at the same time trying to limit the ideological anchorages of the community in order to adapt to the individualist electoral marketing through an organic and lasting interweaving with the media. You can react with fear in the face of this phenomenon, as did the social sciences and most of the public opinion illuminated towards the end of the nineteenth century,

or you can look at America, which has never seen an enemy in charismatic power, because it is capable of conveying the disruptive and individualistic drives of contemporary society in a system which in turn legitimizes and empowers the President as head of the whole nation. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is an example: he saved democracy through his charisma. (Gentile, 2016, p. 170)

Without a community of destiny it is therefore not possible for there to be a lasting policy, and therefore a return of authority as understood in this article is needed, which comes from the past but does not have to imprison politics for this. In this regard, Böckenförde (2007, p. 53) said that the liberal state cannot alone guarantee the regulatory premises on which it rests, but must rely on prepolitical elements in order not to reduce the right to mere contingency. "On the one hand, it can exist as a liberal state only if the freedom, which it guarantees to its citizens, is regulated from within, that is, starting from the moral substance of the individual and the homogeneity of society. On the other hand, if the State tries to guarantee these internal regulatory forces by itself through the means of legal coercion and authoritative command, it renounces its liberality and falls - on a secularized plane - in that same instance of totality from which it was removed with the confessional civil wars".

In the genesis of the state a principle of political-social order has been realized; but of what does the state live and where does it find the strength that supports it, guaranteeing its homogeneity, given that the strength of religion cannot be fundamental for him? As Guglielmo Ferrero (1942) said, legitimacy is summed up in the belief with which the few who command manage to make themselves accepted by the many who obey. Its prerogative is to spread the belief that whoever governs is not a usurper. This is why the main worry of the rulers is to "arouse and cultivate faith in their legitimacy" (Weber, 1922/1961, p. 208). For this reason, the adhesion of citizens depends on the fact that the leader's action conforms to the general weltanschauung, that is, it is in harmony with the world view, the values, the beliefs that tradition has deposited in the people. The principle of legitimacy, therefore, is not isolated; it reflects the dominant general passions. Legitimacy is therefore a religious belief and the chief's job is to give evidence of this legitimacy.

The problem remains open. The methodology of this article based on the bibliographic research and the comparison of classical authors on the subject and on the political-philosophical analysis of modern and contemporary societies does not allow us to draw certain conclusions on how the democracies of the future will agree. Perhaps, however, Gramsci's analysis can trace a solution also in contemporary society, where the crisis of mass parties, replaced by that of the liquidity of movements and associations, needs a moral and intellectual reform, that is, a new religion or vision of the systemic world.

For Gramsci, in fact, the hegemonic principle is analogous to the religious principle (Gramsci, 2008, p. 1236) and has a pedagogical character (p. 1331). The holder of authority and power, however, cannot be a real person, but an organism in which the collective will that has partially asserted itself in the action is realized, in order to organize a wide-ranging maneuver. Precisely for this reason, cultural action is needed to converge and involve the people, despite the inherent pluralism, towards a common goal. This structural reform, to be carried out through strong and politically legitimate institutions, will be able to avoid the dangers associated with the concentration of power in a single person, which would only propose a "defensive" and non-creative and original restoration and reorganization of the previous model, through the foundation of new states and new national and social structures. (p. 1558)

Also because, as Arendt reminded us: "Totalitarian movements find fertile ground for their development wherever there are masses that for one reason or another feel pushed towards political organization, even if they are not held together by a common interest and lacking a specific class consciousness, inclined to propose well-defined, limited and achievable objectives" (Arendt, 1948/1967, p. 431).

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